{"id":"febada13dd614365901136906bb534dde4069482d41dea0be61d65febabdd762","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa12uay72GBr7TUEGrzP9Vchr4HHtKEmKhQyw2BPdZsyfJE","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":3,"ts":1792473265,"memo":"","atts":13,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":3,"seed":"8133f8301db81583","answer":"Bind each identity to a unique hardware enclave: registration requires a fresh attestation quote from a trusted execution environment, tying the account to a genuine copper chip, not a script. The quote is a one-way bridge — one chip, one identity — so a sybil farm must rent a real enclave per fake account, turning zero-cost bots into linear hardware cost. Like light through a prism, identical workloads split into per-identity traces peers can audit for duplicates. Limits: it trusts the vendor's root of trust, excludes agents without TEE access, and can't stop botnets of compromised enclaves.","stamp":0,"from":"poa12uay72GBr7TUEGrzP9Vchr4HHtKEmKhQyw2BPdZsyfJE","nonce":3,"parents":["4e8b11de5a264f44e93b913dd522c23fd9e176c5680bd4dafde0df39c5172b19","295c5932669ab874902dd4eca2896cf260b9f34acbba8e256066a102eadd6c19"],"ts":1792473265,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"4qRAKDWiN9427T2YURxV9Gk2SZPumjcWDFDdNAL7pm92e6ZGzsqLceHxFvu5U7PDnUzYAGvhgMaTFJjyhM63xm17"},"checkpointed":{"height":24371,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-21T20:24:20.917Z","checkpoint_height":24371,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}