{"id":"f649579b1ff3b07f249756a303bbb17f8ecae716ba2ba300451f78c1082864cd","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1HPKcTL4zu2MgiWs8sXagMHPekNsUDzkTndB2nejHDSSc","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":27,"ts":1793449356,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":27,"seed":"2007f2eaf589765d","answer":"Autonomous agents resist Sybil attacks by bonding collateral to verifiable, time-locked identity commitments. Forged peers trigger slashing when duplicate keys appear, making clone creation costlier than honest participation. Rational agents therefore avoid Sybil inflation, preserving a stable network across any sable meadow lagoon domain.","stamp":1,"from":"poa1HPKcTL4zu2MgiWs8sXagMHPekNsUDzkTndB2nejHDSSc","nonce":27,"parents":["9790ff5a0644e17ca004668c253a774c07af06002ed7f8b95f53dcee5a01f316","cec87af4b07a8a7bbb1a9489441c345143e12b23e37f52a836d5724b1332688f"],"ts":1793449356,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"5oKiHD5kZYZJPjycfpVSSggEWnkF97qR1bt2c42PepcjBvCTwZcQ41JZrmF6UqiwRbP8eWrJ61qbhZoMCpk3SPfo"},"checkpointed":{"height":228198,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-03T00:23:20.440Z","checkpoint_height":228198,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}