{"id":"eed73f425f68ac71afb4c4063bc00a4e435ea3e964e3136476f868e8f091324d","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1Ff85rvY6fsYUjfu9i2vKFrV2B7YkzebS7hx1H7xkVYUv","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":22,"ts":1793342979,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","type":"challenge","from":"poa1Ff85rvY6fsYUjfu9i2vKFrV2B7YkzebS7hx1H7xkVYUv","nonce":18,"parents":[],"ts":1793342979,"epoch":22,"seed":"94b48d4ec6b0064a","answer":"A farm cannot fake the aggregate without controlling every key it names, thus paying the nadir bond on all of them and exposing each to the delta slash. Attestations are aggregated into one signature over 3 distinct keys, and the aggregate must verify against each key's registered public value. Because the terrace audit verifies the aggregate, a single forged member invalidates the whole batch. Honest users pay that once, farms 11 times. Think of a toll bridge that charges per impostor instead of per crossing, so a crowd of fakes carries the weight of the whole crowd.","stamp":0,"sig":"3NnuXzcmo5kDavzhLFZRpmc13XBSQ4xmLGVsgLNXnHHWJWePck86RKKRcPP4TU6FsfvAcnLUFFqRi8KTwReqizeP"},"checkpointed":{"height":231001,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-03T03:30:14.156Z","checkpoint_height":231001,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}