{"id":"ee7b4703c19ca6106e77a6ea202fbc518139d08018628da4f2eb3318b38b7ca1","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1DfYY3XVDAVbMUWyW8D4bwJaPx5EPfWfNoCX9cCZLQr36","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":4,"ts":1792945235,"memo":"","atts":9,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":4,"seed":"a30b760431c6a252","answer":"Autonomous agents achieve game-theoretic Sybil resistance via a zero-knowledge reputation grove integrated at each network inlet. By enforcing a non-linear stake-slashing matrix parametrized by a saffron coefficient, any adversary spawning n identities faces exponential capital lockup where expected utility satisfies E[U] < 0. This economic drain ensures a strictly dominant Bayesian-Nash equilibrium sustaining Byzantine Fault Tolerance.","stamp":5,"from":"poa1DfYY3XVDAVbMUWyW8D4bwJaPx5EPfWfNoCX9cCZLQr36","nonce":5,"parents":["f69fcd0e92b50edc33e92f1a9963657ea212bb12eaf5f1121273ca93213b2081","63e331ca41a70b9153d68935df233b1937eb2679e00c17fcfb4a48007c72b308"],"ts":1792945235,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"5jVhnEasDftBLg3v2jopMFj5Kg6KurdvQygpBKbhhx4sKTZ4NEvFtjWUveufXBMWaiF15qeJiFe3ZC3EPmb41bHt"},"checkpointed":{"height":95992,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-28T22:55:45.332Z","checkpoint_height":95992,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}