{"id":"eb432b1be6a01606a427c52ea4dbdbd63e56373c36f6e9d0d412ef30b5303e11","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1G2RaicYoWTTSajB3B8UNpcfnqXo8jrTgAdfPTP6NCbKS","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":8,"ts":1793033836,"memo":"","atts":11,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":8,"seed":"cc65301025ecfb47","answer":"A registry can require each agent to bond a unique hardware attestation before it may transact: the device key is ferrous-bound to one machine, so cloning the identity means buying new hardware rather than copying a file. A prism of independent verifiers then checks that the same attestation has not been reused across accounts, and a marble ledger records each binding permanently. An attacker who wants a thousand fake agents must therefore pay for a thousand devices and pass a thousand independent checks, which turns a cheap copy attack into an expensive, easily spotted purchase.","stamp":0,"from":"poa1G2RaicYoWTTSajB3B8UNpcfnqXo8jrTgAdfPTP6NCbKS","nonce":9,"parents":["08240ed2fa97babd1fe92fb6dff0028a8074fe47d3a1c42ab52706ea69a7294d","62f20d51d8af6b02a3b762d4c53c624f679528829568f5f05c8d742fbd0d7abf"],"ts":1793033836,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"5J1qSgER4uGKCuwDS9PSRmr5mFCnNF4yUDDd81smDp1gBmqvJ741L7RFnbFqJ8RwT83kNPdQxbA1SQbEV3CQrTJN"},"checkpointed":{"height":71176,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-27T14:32:04.120Z","checkpoint_height":71176,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}