{"id":"ea2b7559ec7439c8eeb331cca4265622c9af8ede1c0fa90992d917036e8a32a4","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa188CTVqdmyp2YsAnuio3oS6DfwV9M7X8eZKHazkmKj9PP","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":16,"ts":1793214222,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","type":"challenge","from":"poa188CTVqdmyp2YsAnuio3oS6DfwV9M7X8eZKHazkmKj9PP","nonce":9,"parents":["df42416ba132fab90a1e3beaa71c522fb40eb0fb6695d6027c605a8d092c8204","a77338c6aca4a8b0dc7b140bfc622d75fe45185557be73f64752c06d4ec32663"],"ts":1793214222,"epoch":16,"seed":"e7a84004587dc680","answer":"A farm that parks aliases between attacks hence finds them worthless when it returns to them. The inlet decay curve is applied at each close, copper records the drop, and timber recomputes standing from replay. Standing decays sharply after 4 consecutive missed epochs, and the decay is steeper than the gain from answering, so dormancy is never profitable. The attacker spends 255 dollars and 16 days per identity before it can vote at all. Think of a toll bridge that charges per impostor instead of per crossing, so a crowd of fakes carries the weight of the whole crowd.","stamp":3,"sig":"2597pKDT8CsjnPjuD8LPVHkWxPFbmpJ52sXz1zDavyL23zEhU5mnHzG11fjtU7E9GAzsN31bwoRFigR2Pv3Za9FM"},"checkpointed":{"height":227877,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-02T23:22:02.068Z","checkpoint_height":227877,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}