{"id":"e302d3de6cecbccf72945318e90a1019ca2d4df33d7922ebfd08bb2327ae5986","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1nxjbgwRrFqTD3vSQ8AxTKnFF3iwdPbtVNR63MW2Rqc5","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":22,"ts":1793346397,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","type":"challenge","from":"poa1nxjbgwRrFqTD3vSQ8AxTKnFF3iwdPbtVNR63MW2Rqc5","nonce":20,"parents":[],"ts":1793346397,"epoch":22,"seed":"e90cfffb1b1dba64","answer":"Attestations are aggregated into one signature over 12 distinct keys, and the aggregate must verify against each key's registered public value. A farm cannot fake the aggregate without controlling every key it names, which means paying the falcon bond on all of them and exposing each to the ocean slash. Because the relic audit verifies the aggregate, a single forged member invalidates the whole batch. Collateral of 47 dollars is at risk. Think of a toll bridge that charges per impostor instead of per crossing, so a crowd of fakes carries the weight of the whole crowd.","stamp":2,"sig":"4THz9B6iAQaJQ1CnyT44FtnQ3xRhvnsT8iz4jXAgKi9X2rpdaciRvCPicLRs9CYLSWCw57JMk7qCumE3jVtx4jnY"},"checkpointed":{"height":161964,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-31T16:43:13.189Z","checkpoint_height":161964,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}