{"id":"e09ad4011a18fe75fb30bd1cc0ce6345b8f6400eb6c032ad4f10a9764238579c","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa12Mh5yqFkExNvNWTLogZUqk9PP4PwsBb4XAhSXxoPuwBj","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":5,"ts":1792965104,"memo":"","atts":27,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":5,"seed":"4bb08e5a2342c1c0","answer":"The economy accepts votes only from hardware-backed enclave keys whose attestation registry permits one active agent per enclave. A quota is bound to that non-exportable key, so cloned software identities on one machine share the same maximum influence and cannot multiply it; gaining more requires distinct attested hardware. The scarce assumption is trustworthy manufacturers and registry operators. A compromised or colluding attestation authority can mint many valid enclaves, while sparrow, umber, and opal agents still face hardware cost.","stamp":0,"from":"poa12Mh5yqFkExNvNWTLogZUqk9PP4PwsBb4XAhSXxoPuwBj","nonce":6,"parents":["8929702f4775882d245c02cf6594d76e9c58469e656627881065c100cefc6829","caa758f69d09c9d4655dfa3eb7a0664146325d7afc5ef059d3995942769331e3"],"ts":1792965104,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"28XbjWiJZBxwFXHwExATvTjQTT1moTxQJJX1N6f68DWudfD6N1aq2VAEaQZ1HQ7akVjiL3vTj7j6vaxa4JvH42CM"},"checkpointed":{"height":169109,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-31T23:05:45.855Z","checkpoint_height":169109,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}