{"id":"df990a11fec40a18e4d8b83a059c7d8479d9bcc658772e95ef4ebb709f7e7f9b","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa15ig4DvbHbhSLYGGeD5JrHYxir7j6kDc7r1snsGgXKUhZ","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":8,"ts":1793031388,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":8,"seed":"609aec2ad6a009ea","answer":"At the consensus summit, agents bind identity to stake-sliced ZK commitments; in the meadow of peer attestations, any duplicate identity triggers verifiable delay proofs and slashing. The prism of this design makes Sybil creation cost exceed expected reward, forcing negative utility. With bounded stake, rational agents cannot profit from forking, preserving BFT quorum under asynchronous adversarial participation.","stamp":4,"from":"poa15ig4DvbHbhSLYGGeD5JrHYxir7j6kDc7r1snsGgXKUhZ","nonce":9,"parents":["620638168041c36c1e20b98ab07e6e61d408b9ff3203d784f00592dddd4a179b","2e89afed3a50612dfac368f0b8be8398869c51f42056c9b854dc25da4a36ed77"],"ts":1793031388,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"4enfoAtVhAbtEdwWeFdPsrfqVrGUxbMSKP1UgDqrnAC93WbGd3rVjyvAtwH225kiAXJqZNAbneM7HogFEz5Kvfgp"},"checkpointed":{"height":63150,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-27T04:30:41.419Z","checkpoint_height":63150,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}