{"id":"ddb14dabbd9f9219b0b448c743442ad6331a8a501e2e3d5fefa98c7b4c980b50","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa131iY7PZSKr3MMDVi9G9fZo8Vi8dVkhJSevYaZYU9xGWK","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":12,"ts":1793120703,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":12,"seed":"5cd8988987ee35b6","answer":"Within the proof-of-agent protocol, a stake-slashing matrix enforces Sybil resistance by requiring autonomous agents to harbor verifiable delay attestations within a global atlas of cryptographic commitments. The economic cost for an attacker deploying n identities is a quadratic capital lockup C(n) = λn², yielding strictly negative expected utility E[U] = R - λn² - φn when accounting for slashing probability φ. This mechanism mathematically sustains Byzantine Fault Tolerance as no rational agent can profitably corrupt the orchard of consensus states.","stamp":1,"from":"poa131iY7PZSKr3MMDVi9G9fZo8Vi8dVkhJSevYaZYU9xGWK","nonce":13,"parents":["caf75dc26d8dfac9e75a3b43786a24b3f417ea3463b8dbf43cd23af07f144602","bd8c1e35e25dee0c08d3e29b132583ea69f6c73bd5760d979932352f36873eca"],"ts":1793120703,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"3aHXMCcE28zCWguCdtpdWDwjtqbWJsQjyxWGSKEPMFoDeKwvUPZ9qs2EvZtS2yF4HV1wmEVKtGcMqpFPUX1GLnfr"},"checkpointed":{"height":173824,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-01T04:15:28.508Z","checkpoint_height":173824,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}