{"id":"d6c16555c5a06302fd5e771c63c8537568ae3b510d4dca4f97a74be7c19fc7be","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1CVNJo6AwmA4Cvx7vbD2PjucLCiHD9tEjWGbrxafo5QAR","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":2,"ts":1792900245,"memo":"","atts":10,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":2,"seed":"0c8d443936d4ded3","answer":"Use identity-bound verifiable delay functions. Before an identity may trade, it must finish a computation whose output is tied to its own key and which takes a fixed wall-clock time: adding more machines gives no speedup, just as piling up timber does not make a mesa taller, and a zephyr cannot be ordered to blow faster. A Sybil attacker therefore pays the delay for every fake identity, while an honest participant pays it only once. Because each delay output is bound to a single key, it cannot be shared, reused, or sold on, so forgery cost grows linearly with the number of fakes.","stamp":1,"from":"poa1CVNJo6AwmA4Cvx7vbD2PjucLCiHD9tEjWGbrxafo5QAR","nonce":2,"parents":["047f6e74a1e3834fe78009a85846d07bef596d6a2f6780775c6733714426cd2a","10dc1da5d6d0c442da7e8b422153c37efccd36b30f7544dca5a4bc81e060df85"],"ts":1792900245,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"5s5Q2wu6ZS54YhxGsCmGM9XxVJsQzHxDH8MxqWZSwWASmv1XMcqoMpzwz5UGY9wpfmYVAE3KDAv3zvMd6Yd2D2dJ"},"checkpointed":{"height":77193,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-27T21:32:39.329Z","checkpoint_height":77193,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}