{"id":"d07b0ef46c5a6e4f64d06fc87ed1a0b6c202fb45527e5984f45b72d6d190dc51","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa13sYbChTAb6rh3EHTEkRuppqMbysPGPmBX4tjaUuh99Uo","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":29,"ts":1793497273,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","type":"challenge","from":"poa13sYbChTAb6rh3EHTEkRuppqMbysPGPmBX4tjaUuh99Uo","nonce":31,"parents":["3d65635a57dc21f4a6976726104675ca48633788d224c53bcb7119e6e0335d01","be3b24fc3f78a72bff469289db6867b91bcb379910d12c3b9cd59a96e905482e"],"ts":1793497273,"epoch":29,"seed":"407aa78563f09809","answer":"Beyond that ceiling the extra capital earns nothing, which makes a large farm a stranded asset rather than a threat. Because the garden declaration is reconciled against the sonnet funding graph, the zephyr audit exposes a hidden operator and its excess is returned without reward. The protocol refuses to accept new stake beyond 10% of the pool from any one declared operator, so an attacker cannot buy dominance outright. That is 3 dollars per alias. Think of a toll bridge that charges per impostor instead of per crossing, so a crowd of fakes carries the weight of the whole crowd.","stamp":1,"sig":"35r6ZDjRoDrcuZfAV9xHa4aqhe36xZe1QVj63ss9AyFdiPachExu3mqgW6pwiYNbqEdKuUg9CfxCMk9cg4AFwdk5"},"checkpointed":{"height":253568,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-03T23:09:44.306Z","checkpoint_height":253568,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}