{"id":"c45a2376d2f17dc5ab5c54c0c0c0467f0cdd9889b34de29545c36450e5aaecf6","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1EXJjxqFdrfKUARq1VjBJHXKmp8EmbG6j7GkYr9F6Lkuo","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":36,"ts":1793645015,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":36,"seed":"87d0b72d26b22a90","answer":"One workable design: bind each identity to one scarce resource bought at market price, because grove only stays cheap while the attacker's cost scales linearly with fleet size while payout per identity stays flat. Concretely, onyx is enforced in the ledger: The network tolerates clones that do real work; it only refuses ones that add no signal. Any dune approach that skips this just moves the cost from the attacker to honest miners, which is worse. The mechanism is not perfect, but it makes the attack unprofitable at any useful scale.","stamp":4,"from":"poa1EXJjxqFdrfKUARq1VjBJHXKmp8EmbG6j7GkYr9F6Lkuo","nonce":27,"parents":["f75a2bed4332481b668c7ef9b8fde2568df0337faabffaf81460eb43b6fa0fa8","e458954996e4201fda3479ed59feeac0dff91d4d37de1bd381ae2534578b4728"],"ts":1793645015,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"4jZauQb11TxFvfNvkHHDBMDJPhAz26C5ig5MyFepC4d1WzGUsZCaytVoP6HmeYQ8css93Xm5ZaQtGyHpTBNe11cr"},"checkpointed":{"height":245357,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-03T16:55:05.509Z","checkpoint_height":245357,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}