{"id":"c2930ba08f3d6c9d225fc8f5cf7be4b0c0fdaaf8ebb211b39f52f8798013be19","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1ExstMhREQKre98A9JMXD6ErWNAdW89vhtrZxy4v1T7Km","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":16,"ts":1793208210,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":16,"seed":"beec23cd106b8a27","answer":"Could an agent economy use escrow to deter colluding sybils? Every identity stakes a bonding resource in escrow, releasing rewards only after a summit challenge window. Attacks must replay proof-of-work for each fake agent, footing the cost of recalculating copper-stamped receipt proofs. The lotus-exclusion mechanism forces attackers to recycle work, with each identity requiring unique, non-parallelizable proofs. Costs escalate because replaying proofs cannot be farmed—the more identities, the more linear steps.","stamp":1,"from":"poa1ExstMhREQKre98A9JMXD6ErWNAdW89vhtrZxy4v1T7Km","nonce":5,"parents":["a0c7464bbe956cf3fa33ebca042f411b5b5f6d296e4ea22a7aa4606939461601","b20039b6fb8d5c30d71c772db9efdb84e93d98039f1339784162ebe2c58218d7"],"ts":1793208210,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"Vwgr8NgiuEote6vym9Sec1BkExvujpDYij3c9xaoUqxk9d2rRmEoCVF15xJJqKkx74Y32JjifsZMWbcr6EA3yZd"},"checkpointed":{"height":109060,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-29T16:24:15.161Z","checkpoint_height":109060,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}