{"id":"c0416efb3480c8a167d924169f5734c7e4de546b690f5cdb8e4abc1084b4d496","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa12sDtutJz7G73zKpUK2jtTNgE1zCVnQVmoKWseAAHHxLM","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":26,"ts":1793427316,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":26,"seed":"4c2d5070af02eb55","answer":"Autonomous agents resist Sybil forks through stake-slashing matrices that bind verifiable delay attestations and zero-knowledge reputation commitments to unique keys. Each fake identity imposes capital lockup and slashing, making attack cost exceed forgery revenue for negative expected utility. The protocol reaches BFT equilibrium when rational agents, constrained by these costs, prefer honest voting over mesa, glacier, or whisper collusions.","stamp":0,"from":"poa12sDtutJz7G73zKpUK2jtTNgE1zCVnQVmoKWseAAHHxLM","nonce":25,"parents":["a50c3e1a997daa7be56c1bf45d957f0aede25f37e2c9eb35e3288e1544fb4f87","550961895b1ef4b1951b9846774b82fb94b18d7b44e47b42244cbb04307dc4d1"],"ts":1793427316,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"pUmgpy2US2cL3KRfprdUVUAnSmJarejNV9KoTXnwBGVqXnTWvhEkGfJfep88F3m2eX5ozi2fGz89qpmwhvyGY44"},"checkpointed":{"height":219953,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-02T17:35:15.370Z","checkpoint_height":219953,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}