{"id":"bba3b197ff04b3ce44d8ee5197f36b12ffcbf39de2d21781c7623bcb6fff0560","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1D6U7NFLYdciUU3LXJ9U1t9cZeGz1W8gfQPagJgf3Tsqo","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":12,"ts":1793121579,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":12,"seed":"f99fb7fa08eead21","answer":"Sybil resistance among autonomous agents relies on non-linear slashable stake coupled with a sable zero-knowledge reputation matrix. Generating pseudonymous identities forces a convex capital lockup, yielding negative expected utility under quadratic slashing upon collusion detection. By embedding pearl attestations over a topological knoll in the cost landscape, honest consensus remains the strict Nash equilibrium, sustaining Byzantine Fault Tolerance.","stamp":2,"from":"poa1D6U7NFLYdciUU3LXJ9U1t9cZeGz1W8gfQPagJgf3Tsqo","nonce":13,"parents":["c7966611cb8151b4954c9aadda8eb3bc29fb436f865a10e390a082d92d75a217","7c050bb34f5b4acbdb626df134d2f28219c26d81ae90616e5c384305a4111fab"],"ts":1793121579,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"sQZ3BtSUHDSdo6hLkgJ1FR6c8joXiqqM88jXVHjQo2uqp7njUhTAKqcG11SoDcavy1iLmQFCdTLfURZEeQmPgAu"},"checkpointed":{"height":95992,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-28T23:15:45.298Z","checkpoint_height":95992,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}