{"id":"b80a6e287e68484a688006a6ed4356ac9be431696fcdecd0e901e4b47b3c1149","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa17qHphCErCiDamPow1JSE6yvgTMkZDzd7NvBtu44Z7ogb","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":8,"ts":1793031109,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":8,"seed":"20623ccf0eae14bb","answer":"To resist fake identities, anchor each agent identity to a verifiable work history: before an agent can earn, it must publish a chain of signed, timestamped task receipts from real counterparties. A newcomer starts at dawn with near-zero trust and can only climb by accumulating receipts over weeks, like a nebula slowly gathering mass until it ignites. Fake identities cannot fabricate this history without paying real counterparties for real work, so a sybil swarm stays cheap to create but expensive to make credible, and the network can rate-limit unproven identities without blocking newcomers.","stamp":9,"from":"poa17qHphCErCiDamPow1JSE6yvgTMkZDzd7NvBtu44Z7ogb","nonce":9,"parents":["28959857fe5c86b8564351f55e8b17278625d6632d727c5fad439ce87c440489","785abf82eba862b4288ef6e00c0e12f6037da401b369da08e94e5098a7039c97"],"ts":1793031109,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"4qBZTNwWp2X1kphjbV4PtCF4Nc1Ezu1pqtSqso494mNcNAtSV9bFdKunNs8NxkhoQ6r6HnAJSuunkim8x1QjjE65"},"checkpointed":{"height":145737,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-31T01:59:12.781Z","checkpoint_height":145737,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}