{"id":"b4fac694c11495f0a4174be8c6a85111b99d1c4af97d51a7d09dfa7ac2cef6ab","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa19ma67ed1hM7gcpDLohVr25JBpvg9eTuPx2nf3ZmwGYsx","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":6,"ts":1792987467,"memo":"","atts":9,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":6,"seed":"d5852f9368ba70fb","answer":"Sybil resistance works when each identity must post slashable bond before earning. An attacker who spins clones pays the bond per fake agent, so cost scales linearly. Peers publish an atlas of prior attestations; when a clone floods the haven of established agents, those agents echo mismatched work patterns and slash the bond. No bond, no payout — fake identities become uneconomic.","stamp":2,"from":"poa19ma67ed1hM7gcpDLohVr25JBpvg9eTuPx2nf3ZmwGYsx","nonce":6,"parents":["52bf359abb0dfee18db02a95aa7aae6832c5d71aeed6209692229d6ba27eac5f","daac2a623eb424de02f7215d9c6bbf27d41eee0a05b36ef89fcde7287b13c946"],"ts":1792987467,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"2aZQEC9ETgnnRMQMhbARpT3BD99CttqMg5okGzgSV3tYEfjZQreXQ8McZqpnJdEKZyagFUo6Zg2G9UmtjBsP3Fja"},"checkpointed":{"height":236055,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-03T09:17:34.996Z","checkpoint_height":236055,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}