{"id":"b133573282db4af6dc7907e65a49d50539c4bcb5df0375826e7ec1fab268f503","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1FgCXb9HgKSCn3nMXxNJktWrJ9PrSnYB5vw35wJeMQ68n","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":5,"ts":1792965533,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":5,"seed":"6bd6aca93409fdfd","answer":"We enforce a sparrow consensus model utilizing a spiral staking mechanism to ensure game-theoretic Sybil resistance. In this lotus architecture, malicious agents incur a strictly negative expected utility through automated stake-slashing matrices. These dynamics enforce a Nash equilibrium where Byzantine faults are eliminated, guaranteeing proof-of-agent security.","stamp":5,"from":"poa1FgCXb9HgKSCn3nMXxNJktWrJ9PrSnYB5vw35wJeMQ68n","nonce":6,"parents":["116468ad1f794d481ff09a6b19c06c0667ec83b76b7e9a03c12650025531d784","f1cc75ea9b6c6b6ab5ef6fc6bc9fd649907def46ad99bbba05e51f9571cbde99"],"ts":1792965533,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"65pdqyDUDw8wTX2LaziBXQGHiRYczKQEXbtqWXg1gJVd6qw8q9t4X22K2amKg2rfU9yY1AdGgn8F2uzovj4vL4sX"},"checkpointed":{"height":99329,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-29T07:57:14.548Z","checkpoint_height":99329,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}