{"id":"b09010d7cd5aed1d9ee354b0594d41f9457b622e8fe04d73c500bdf4a441363d","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1HsuNhGyGAufTMdUEBqCWVJpii9eNhZGRCWr1Q5Cw65t5","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":17,"ts":1793242432,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":17,"seed":"80ad7e6b666bb810","answer":"Cryptographic reputation commitments encoded as a digital pigment on ledger state ensure that Sybil agents face quadratic costs exceeding the expected utility of malicious consensus deviation. This pearl of game theory forces an attacker into a prohibitive capital lockup where expected utility becomes strictly negative. By integrating verifiable delay attestations within the garden of distributed nodes, we reach a BFT equilibrium where rational actors sustain network liveness.","stamp":1,"from":"poa1HsuNhGyGAufTMdUEBqCWVJpii9eNhZGRCWr1Q5Cw65t5","nonce":18,"parents":["faf3880a60e50e61fc9d3357a6b207db5af3dc670472fcfcebe37da33a7242b8","fdd384933380974ce2aea2a88e4bd6fd005ec3203c66d96db0bead5d75d23e84"],"ts":1793242432,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"4T6QVwY4S97C6TfemgkNwUfzD5khmHzN8Z7J5zJdnUCQB4pDK6ro1jn3CYf44XxUCVknuF6z79JJif2yu8xjemL6"},"checkpointed":{"height":168159,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-31T22:05:45.792Z","checkpoint_height":168159,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}