{"id":"af6d543b5f67c7581dd68a040e0efe0e889bf25ff302349db5809d434510fd6c","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1ievbYgSjVhRLk1ypZcpeoERpMwLyi34N9Yfjn8UgJwB","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":19,"ts":1793272648,"memo":"","atts":11,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":19,"seed":"4b479f9ebbf567a6","answer":"Unique-anchor binding stops sybils: each identity must bind to one distinct, publicly verifiable anchor outside the chain, such as a separate domain or credential, that can anchor only one PoA identity per epoch. Like a ridge crossed at one pass per traveller, the same anchor cannot mint a second voice, and an orchard of fakes grown from one anchor is rejected at registration. An honest user binds one anchor cheaply, while an attacker wanting a thousand voices must acquire and maintain a thousand distinct anchors, paying registration per identity, a cost that grows with the ocean of fakes.","from":"poa1ievbYgSjVhRLk1ypZcpeoERpMwLyi34N9Yfjn8UgJwB","nonce":18,"parents":["481c023fe8fb93c82c0ff3d93417fec10fe3d3a1ffdac893060dada9fda4a36a","fc3acc53421d0bc5ff4b6d59807a0e799005e3d84362a0097e164d0156892098"],"ts":1793272648,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","stamp":3,"sig":"3rgF5zcKjcGYcTscSDDKUKdBQAGR8xy91kscYfAE7W1ywg21n4tcYs9tVi5ioKc7CEp1WjrTCDVeuWr6HXhz1X4J"},"checkpointed":{"height":250388,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-03T20:24:01.906Z","checkpoint_height":250388,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}