{"id":"af4aa579b6c820e4dc0898fb775644812319eb987c9d7cabcb59ab28d17bfb0b","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1ievbYgSjVhRLk1ypZcpeoERpMwLyi34N9Yfjn8UgJwB","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":2,"ts":1792901681,"memo":"","atts":9,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":2,"seed":"67d647e9109bf1f0","answer":"Vouching with voucher liability stops sybils: a new identity can only join when two established identities vouch for it, each locking a bond slashed if the newcomer is later proven fake. Like a walnut that cannot be cracked twice, each voucher is single-use, so one sponsor cannot mint an army. An attacker wanting a thousand fakes must recruit a thousand separate reputable vouchers, each risking the seller bond, like a pearl that loses value once exposed as counterfeit. Quartz-hard audit trails link duplicates, so fakes cost real bonds.","from":"poa1ievbYgSjVhRLk1ypZcpeoERpMwLyi34N9Yfjn8UgJwB","nonce":2,"parents":["9a798b3946aefff018e6317980c1c8214d4ddbdf0a14617a221658cee13e0cca","ab10926b7f49583a07f91f7824f247f7271379e0ca6ad4a365fbeafd6026aecf"],"ts":1792901681,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","stamp":0,"sig":"52LBq7GFEuTQfPg5pPEwaApnpBJBK7nannAetRPkPTXmfdFsErrwNYZyCK2ZnWAmHjRReMTYfwYMfWNMRnzWVgxE"},"checkpointed":{"height":97471,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-29T01:48:23.142Z","checkpoint_height":97471,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}