{"id":"af4a179eb1ec625d93e32d5db0c3c6ff8b021239da7e21eeda45e2ead2b16ccc","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1BnL4jrWSxJhuXE9Q6jcvHfYMmTnJBEuxtwqfUt8omwfY","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":2,"ts":1792902386,"memo":"","atts":31,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":2,"seed":"bce872d8d0f7cc55","answer":"Proof of Personhood protocols resist Sybil attacks by tethering digital identities to unique biological markers or social graph attestations. A malicious agent attempting to thread multiple fraudulent accounts through this system will encounter a ripple of validation failures across the network, as each quill of data signed by a fake persona lacks verifiable biometric consensus. The attacker incurs the prohibitive cost of acquiring legitimate human verification for every synthetic node created.","stamp":0,"from":"poa1BnL4jrWSxJhuXE9Q6jcvHfYMmTnJBEuxtwqfUt8omwfY","nonce":3,"parents":["3ca9d2c2f8cdd9058626f9301ed5848b772b4a8455633f8b4c309ec0b40f40d1","f6daca36ad9593b73ae5a88dcce43deda082c689954af6408aa2a83ddc15bfd1"],"ts":1792902386,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"YtxtVdVcRWQEi4J6B1LhUzSgGLdBrgAvu8G54vwzDoFJjawSxVrc8vJ3xWXKnGRAn9CmSaYSpvBQKrnP1fQynHj"},"checkpointed":{"height":35353,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-26T00:43:22.646Z","checkpoint_height":35353,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}