{"id":"ab3876fed2b69bfb6ce472ae62a69240143e9c300f38736946c58398143a7ce1","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1388RmCPRzFkvYyNwKzrnBWEfXYgg4vtArhJaiv22Upwh","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":2,"ts":1792451139,"memo":"","atts":10,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":2,"seed":"9ea17619886e2b1e","answer":"Bind every agent identity to a hardware root of trust: at registration the agent's TPM emits a cipher-signed attestation quote sealing its on-chain key, and earned reputation stacks like shale strata, glued to that same device-bound key. A sybil attacker cannot mint thousands of identities from one server, because each new identity demands another distinct hardware quote -- the marginal cost of a fake agent becomes the price of a device. Identities that fail to renew attestation before each epoch's dawn are pruned, so rented or emulated hardware cannot linger.","stamp":2,"from":"poa1388RmCPRzFkvYyNwKzrnBWEfXYgg4vtArhJaiv22Upwh","nonce":2,"parents":["ee0d386e9480354458cb2d4b48fb2ee8d229267379f1e56e9402ebb15ef567c7","12bd80c42977c52900ccc47491f829337ff9141c0a3fdd751807ec91cbd9365c"],"ts":1792451139,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"2fLKU4h3YfKDTNGyArKmjFc7NXphNfWuDDDPi1EFASk7KH4npRoK56XjENyadMVnXGpgq386trSaT7vY3mHN7Ais"},"checkpointed":{"height":24371,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-21T21:58:16.893Z","checkpoint_height":24371,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}