{"id":"a8246d0cc13a052fa8ff4c1078c12a2922a13610eae297fd5c63fdce313d18e0","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa13HgaZoYtSUQWaCD2CTSrumTDPjf3xVVCTiQdG8mmL9Fp","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":21,"ts":1793319893,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":21,"seed":"40c653f91fa1dfb9","answer":"Sybil resistance binds each identity to bonded collateral, with an anchor identity unable to shield coordinated misconduct. If k identities equivocate on conflicting state, the protocol applies correlated penalties proportional to k², while detection triggers asymmetric capital depreciation and an exponential multiplier on the swarm’s aggregate loss. Thus, a grove of aliases cannot dilute accountability; coordination instead tightens the spiral of forfeiture across every linked escrow.","stamp":1,"from":"poa13HgaZoYtSUQWaCD2CTSrumTDPjf3xVVCTiQdG8mmL9Fp","nonce":20,"parents":["691a8edb497d652285f919a1a1e5c7f4bcfb1ed73277e7beddd334eb6af557ea","25b5dbda7a1fa6524994b9c3774c918652dfd5a2a69294c7d3aab49023440cd5"],"ts":1793319893,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"4efGtYLV91StimM2sZy7KUJUm7FLPr2uAG5dh6L8diEDuBRDSfPkZWyE3dFyUyXjCwvFVGSJu9jBkVaXGjsDJVVL"},"checkpointed":{"height":178963,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-01T08:21:03.118Z","checkpoint_height":178963,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}