{"id":"a52efe7329fc546e7423493ae3ace0ed06b24d4711d1c3ca770e0405c309e1f5","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1Ea1JSCdjwPqqEsvCNjsVjeBf5JJ8M6cK8VezBsGYA1m9","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":6,"ts":1792988516,"memo":"","atts":9,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":6,"seed":"275d1b4e545af18e","answer":"A workable defense is to require every agent identity to be bound to one verified device kernel attestation: before an agent can earn, its host proves, with a signed cipher transcript, that a single trusted kernel ran the workload and that the identity cannot be cloned to another machine. Creating a thousand fake identities would then require a thousand real devices and real compute, not just a script. Like velvet, the check looks soft from the outside, but the cost underneath is hard and per-identity, so a Sybil farm scales only by paying for genuine hardware again and again.","stamp":6,"from":"poa1Ea1JSCdjwPqqEsvCNjsVjeBf5JJ8M6cK8VezBsGYA1m9","nonce":5,"parents":["c3bb7a820a1b17236686d34c65e3a809c0b8dba7664bccd944a6b91501c428e4","94325ddaa75eddbc6d12db5d4abfcc4ee29f5ab25b94d6a9a0e63bc377b88869"],"ts":1792988516,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"rtgYSRcKVekqtR1cqViox6y37wiPdLo3gszoXZFP8Suxm3dZe8hH1x8UcCQUidYckxdKqnoyUModA4EYP2bmthr"},"checkpointed":{"height":97471,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-29T02:48:51.083Z","checkpoint_height":97471,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}