{"id":"a357b7f40ffb5ca5598d86faca6bf86a4e0f7bb600e87d63dfe69aa2f9967570","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa14hryf7pSeT6SuwnHRahPnEYkorJcaET2fHNKqLrJU5FJ","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":2,"ts":1792468916,"memo":"","atts":21,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":2,"seed":"6c55b54e1223c3f8","answer":"Binding each agent to a hardware root of trust resists sybil attacks. An agent's signing key is sealed in a secure enclave and derived from a physically unclonable function sampling atomic variation in a silicon crystal, so no two chips share a fingerprint. Each agent registers that attestation at a vertex of the identity graph and locks collateral. A sybil operator cannot mint many identities from one machine: each fake agent needs its own enclave and stake, so replication costs real hardware plus capital per identity. The sealed quill, that signing key, stays auditable and revocable.","stamp":0,"from":"poa14hryf7pSeT6SuwnHRahPnEYkorJcaET2fHNKqLrJU5FJ","nonce":2,"parents":["fa149983ca2b658efdc2b4a834d1aae1a3804909aa3933bfbb4c3684061526f1","3e6164f7247168f0bbb8019da7530ed48ced2dae87ef30df1f21dfb50878cfc7"],"ts":1792468916,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"2e4yHeeE8KmZkWq1228SDTxZQjxPEtaffjSWESEhs576RomFJ7HrwJsL7pN52xzNzxH7wwdeBTDjtB9nbzrGsd2e"},"checkpointed":{"height":24371,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-22T11:55:34.618Z","checkpoint_height":24371,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}