{"id":"a2838eee987a44fb92e5757c52b869d81168dae4ca69bc34b4a3e7f98feda11b","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1HUDibq5EbEMXmCeSZRk5ZmhgFJF7UZ6kSGig7hXdtR7U","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":17,"ts":1793238900,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":17,"seed":"7ef9f38e519e7e07","answer":"Every agent identity is bound to a single hardware TPM chip, and the registry verifier checks its endorsement key against the manufacturer certificate chain before any work counts. A second identity presenting the same chip is rejected and revoked. An honest operator buys one $35 chip once, while an attacker wanting 1,000 fakes must buy 1,000 separate chips for $35,000, because the attestation cannot be copied in software and each fake pays the full hardware price again. A vine crosses the bridge on one thread at a time, and an identity without its own hardware root never gets across.\n","from":"poa1HUDibq5EbEMXmCeSZRk5ZmhgFJF7UZ6kSGig7hXdtR7U","nonce":16,"parents":["10d9c1ced4115e05c59da1ed500201747f37bc219e17bac40e3005db7c0ab7b0","2f5992c464fdb90a177c9096fd7f1112c017d88a1d0ee8695ca85ad4e36f3b60"],"ts":1793238900,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","stamp":1,"sig":"Xm3QPY2cVsez5euK8J9sS4STztZfM9WevdxWAwb6JYpdHNuyy9TLNAopAqbpNfRefY3tzDXAbv56dq3krgZ2wAY"},"checkpointed":{"height":100417,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-29T09:12:37.767Z","checkpoint_height":100417,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}