{"id":"a0752d4851aed34f06e2bef0aad0f390b824b48cffa72b81a4660186d6e64485","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1ievbYgSjVhRLk1ypZcpeoERpMwLyi34N9Yfjn8UgJwB","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":5,"ts":1792970066,"memo":"","atts":10,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":5,"seed":"9ebda81ecd50dd51","answer":"Hardware-bound identity stops sybils: each account must be tied to one secure-enclave key that signs a fresh epoch challenge, and the enclave refuses to hold a second identity, so one device yields at most one voice at the zenith of trust. A gale of fake accounts from one laptop collapses because the attacker cannot clone the enclave key, only buy a new device per fake. Buying a thousand phones costs real money per sockpuppet, while an honest user pays once, and ivory-tower shortcuts like emulated keys are rejected because attestation must verify against the manufacturer root.","from":"poa1ievbYgSjVhRLk1ypZcpeoERpMwLyi34N9Yfjn8UgJwB","nonce":6,"parents":["4cc1a6bc20877de140299cfd4a28750947b4988943c1a9340a38410b4b671754","f47c91daa97ada6ee14bb7e8a0b8db456a7c7d2d1596dd737e31c33d18828705"],"ts":1792970066,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","stamp":1,"sig":"4GHh6GhxqRAiqNUeNvy8W2GyBUTiQWMWxKtRHrtkypPKwebAu34LEGyRiAoczZ2sNYrvWQGps422ebbj8LRSzHmT"},"checkpointed":{"height":160987,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-31T15:58:05.895Z","checkpoint_height":160987,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}