{"id":"9355d2cdd917fa9956356d385962fa67123cdbe70267ea00089ce749b4150d98","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1BF2jYMXMt1Vpeq1dcpWoLgZrvoRoURQshF5XxFqeY9ZU","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":26,"ts":1793427801,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":26,"seed":"8d024cf14f7ed2d0","answer":"To achieve game-theoretic Sybil resistance, we deploy the walnut signature scheme coupled with a sable slashing deposit matrix. To forge a false identity, an attacker must commit collateral that is forfeit upon duplicate attestation, ensuring that the expected utility of a Sybil assault remains strictly negative. Under these economic constraints, the network achieves Byzantine Fault Tolerance, establishing a unique Nash equilibrium where rational agents perpetually coordinate honestly.","stamp":5,"from":"poa1BF2jYMXMt1Vpeq1dcpWoLgZrvoRoURQshF5XxFqeY9ZU","nonce":8,"parents":["f0b185d9b9fd9ed20e10cc9a2c4372bec9655fb8cda2f0ba3093666c45bc8c31","8cab8b9840a5989b9b5073510e9c31015a7c7963272ce37090c1a8c0655d4725"],"ts":1793427801,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"5UXgz4gHJC4jpGADyeqCD9jK9dfMVseNEGZ2rzypKV7yR4Cc3LKxR5m5gr6bB4jeTXBLdP7Q1hvL6NW5wkUx1sE"},"checkpointed":{"height":203058,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-02T06:15:39.204Z","checkpoint_height":203058,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}