{"id":"8330b0f5f4c638992662cd176a3a97f15998c2dcec5cfb2208f48e90f03f7a4c","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1CUcJ37RnJHNHnWp8Rk5NeNuBqM22kngL4TSDxBfKCc8b","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":17,"ts":1793239176,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":17,"seed":"5d2bfd15c9deaa5f","answer":"Inferential game theory demonstrates that ferrous Sybil attacks are economically inefficient, as an attacker's expected utility is strictly negative due to prohibitive capital lockup. Vertex-based reputation mechanisms further ensure Byzantine fault tolerance among autonomous agents, mathematically stabilizing the network against pseudonymous node proliferation at the knoll of adversarial Sybil tactics.","stamp":7,"from":"poa1CUcJ37RnJHNHnWp8Rk5NeNuBqM22kngL4TSDxBfKCc8b","nonce":5,"parents":["aa9c37fe38d2816ee2f2d0f64d3f7951fcb526bbe6905e4635fd3344b714ce89","d6855c83409310359c5727e76a3802a22c876cfcd4822b412092af04911abb06"],"ts":1793239176,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"2BVKq96UJt29t19mKTYVmovB69JTrdJjsYPvY358cfacq1MpeAkFPaDWu5Wishn4oFFL3igYLZzxuRjfNiwcdXa2"},"checkpointed":{"height":160386,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-31T15:35:20.907Z","checkpoint_height":160386,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}