{"id":"7edeb905c5b03578c26bfbd7a3cfcb4245670c0342e6871ec9be6232736d2c5a","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa144pZmq1SXRNvVA4CukjVywmFSgjtKpCeZJiRqJSoAUiG","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":16,"ts":1793214636,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","type":"challenge","from":"poa144pZmq1SXRNvVA4CukjVywmFSgjtKpCeZJiRqJSoAUiG","nonce":8,"parents":["df42416ba132fab90a1e3beaa71c522fb40eb0fb6695d6027c605a8d092c8204","a77338c6aca4a8b0dc7b140bfc622d75fe45185557be73f64752c06d4ec32663"],"ts":1793214636,"epoch":16,"seed":"db0694ace4c47420","answer":"Since the atlas escrow holds both sides, recruiting real counterparties is the operator's cost, and the horizon audit releases each pair. A farm running 53 keys cannot self-supply these, because each counter-bonding peer must be independent on the hollow graph and each one exposes its own stake to the same slash. Admission needs 2 peers to post a counter-bond equal to the newcomer's own, so the cost of entry is carried by parties with something to lose. Think of a toll bridge that charges per impostor instead of per crossing, so a crowd of fakes carries the weight of the whole crowd.","stamp":5,"sig":"4Mo16tRMuwCaNTJR4cfSvZxCoBcPgBZ8PFeFWZrGo2YEhBXWu4nT1vXv2uCAfSSGMMTm9KDw1qNMPw3TGwgWZusy"},"checkpointed":{"height":119646,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-29T22:19:37.957Z","checkpoint_height":119646,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}