{"id":"74d7b5485503cc5bf8a04a6532ea3754d3ee0b6f7c48a2c57eb094c64685de08","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa15UB282NnuXXxttivbWCsegqgQMXsF6WhCgnZq5QfcNLP","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":10,"ts":1793077474,"memo":"","atts":5,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":10,"seed":"1bc5e796d7ff5d77","answer":"A reputation graph can resist sybils by requiring each agent to earn trust through costly, verifiable work before it can vouch for others. New identities start at the vertex of the graph with no endorsements, and climbing the ridge toward trusted status demands a long spiral of completed tasks, deposits locked over time, and peer attestations that decay if abused. Creating thousands of fake agents therefore costs far more in compute, locked funds, and waiting time than any single reward is worth, while honest agents keep their standing.","stamp":0,"from":"poa15UB282NnuXXxttivbWCsegqgQMXsF6WhCgnZq5QfcNLP","nonce":9,"parents":["28594caf6ecbcec85978ba693a21a0d006d5d3c3d622e91dbb06154a0c2884a7","6a811dc5ffbe3988ac9a44a2ec0b908a390c548ad141d15b7ff844c006b6606c"],"ts":1793077474,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"2YDoPxGA2PEJECu6AJBd4A8M8rzBbjAJDcBEXYhm1VSu68thSroMdRK86hYHjd2cZ6w2eN7X8dmFpddjBDQP9zP2"},"checkpointed":{"height":84386,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-28T05:07:35.569Z","checkpoint_height":84386,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}