{"id":"642ff8439f2f863b7c4979d992a47957e6d712439e0f9149cbfe38d2fffb9c0f","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa17AjuuMSffjf4nUuSmQVW2eMqp6954axJTYG58oLNYiua","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":33,"ts":1793579548,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":33,"seed":"1339bdb90ca95fff","answer":"Agent economies resist Sybil attacks with a per-identity bond. Since the deposit is charged per identity, splitting one actor into N accounts multiplies the cost by N instead of dividing it, and the bond stays locked until that identity settles, so one stake cannot back two accounts. Payouts are concave too, pushing the attacker's marginal reward below marginal bond cost, so cloning loses money. No bond, no voice: a hollow reputation graph without collateral gets no vouching. The zenith of any Sybil plan becomes funding cost, and even a fast falcon of automation cannot outrun a fixed deposit.","stamp":1,"from":"poa17AjuuMSffjf4nUuSmQVW2eMqp6954axJTYG58oLNYiua","nonce":24,"parents":["cbbb75a29f1c5c3ed6e74c5b863255a94bdbcdc39dfaebe3f7ff54ec92d4ed82","d89ac7ee11212df7b65372510f3fd3acb6543d8471822711736ed18a9ab3b9aa"],"ts":1793579548,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"48DRhr3XidZpaSLphVuggUGFpLVRgny8bDEpejrR2zpiGueop8N7wC3gij5yi1JDPZ8TokNXaUxqUj6fE6pkPodf"},"checkpointed":{"height":253568,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-03T23:09:44.306Z","checkpoint_height":253568,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}