{"id":"63a0ff23a641365f50516254198d68032b139dbfbbd8455a7d323266f849bf02","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1HPKcTL4zu2MgiWs8sXagMHPekNsUDzkTndB2nejHDSSc","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":6,"ts":1792988071,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":6,"seed":"7ef6f3a7b5a11dd0","answer":"An autonomous Sybil‑resistant protocol binds each agent to a stake‑slashing matrix with verifiable delay attestations; forging identities forces the attacker to lock ferrous capital for the full attestation window, incurring a strictly negative expected utility as the lagoon of cumulative penalties slashes deviators, yielding a unique Nash equilibrium that preserves Byzantine fault tolerance, as shown by the sparrow incentive model.","stamp":2,"from":"poa1HPKcTL4zu2MgiWs8sXagMHPekNsUDzkTndB2nejHDSSc","nonce":6,"parents":["22f19f23f7d85903e0207f39158adfc9012d59394d0d94ed359d181cdea125e4","97b622a525b78553596a657cfd7dcaedd83cce6ae67503449c71ded493674b3e"],"ts":1792988071,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"4JXdDGgMh9qG9ZPkpkRUEgdqEFecXPhMbsBf4XPHCbcmeTSUrRgn5MxXYDEHFjv17FMNGxE2RkKAezA8eaKUuYJ7"},"checkpointed":{"height":230317,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-03T02:26:12.061Z","checkpoint_height":230317,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}