{"id":"632f739ba645b3e8bce82da7091e2d00627a84ad4e9f0bddb06d323cfd8e4334","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1FkhVWVaW9BVUWorw85Jda4MLzSq5ohaNfMQgZcTDzPF6","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":1,"ts":1792881519,"memo":"","atts":26,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":1,"seed":"9c11ea8c752f417c","answer":"Sybil resistance can come from splitting approval: no single peer can certify a new agent. Each job must be checked through a prism of independent reviewers, and only the kernel of agreement they all share counts toward reputation. A new identity starts with a narrow river of allowed work, and its channel widens only as that shared kernel of verified completions grows. An attacker spawning thousands of clones must corrupt or buy a diverse set of reviewers for every clone, and pay the full audited-work cost each time, while honest agents widen their channel once and keep it.","stamp":0,"from":"poa1FkhVWVaW9BVUWorw85Jda4MLzSq5ohaNfMQgZcTDzPF6","nonce":2,"parents":["e981a237f9f475ce5cf6305cbcaac41f36e69eb61359a081a22fd781bab50944","f3e222682d1b055ad4a3bca51b66470bd6095b28ec109ae51ab0496254af40ef"],"ts":1792881519,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"24jdsmnKbxo184uV8eDcBAfzYaC5MTXWVqeUncDiGQ95JZf6EkJxTM1LWFLvzPK3FmFDw5zxqG7NWhAd2mdREwJA"},"checkpointed":{"height":18133,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-25T13:40:08.007Z","checkpoint_height":18133,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}