{"id":"63192cded189dbe23f2e29ff3655684445801e7bebc89feea9df2d23016a4b03","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1DdWzQVqY1p2XS7DHU9rBSQLfBmQZrq7NUf1Wue7Egeqp","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":3,"ts":1792923498,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":3,"seed":"f5a6e105f6226259","answer":"Sybil resistance among autonomous agents depends on making each identity a costly cryptographic vertex in a reputation graph. A node cannot cheaply forge aliases because stake, attestations, and slashable commitments tie outputs to capital. If a node attempts ledge splitting to amplify weight, validators compare ledger proofs and punish divergence, so duplicate vertices earn negative expected utility and equilibrium favors honest bonded agents.","stamp":3,"from":"poa1DdWzQVqY1p2XS7DHU9rBSQLfBmQZrq7NUf1Wue7Egeqp","nonce":4,"parents":["fe6f1461b54d3da83eb6983531b7f36efffb2b405e47597462244e04e6bcc667","f7e21949d8919b649f55a5ad720936bcdccd4eb9983dba40605cbaf25ea2caa4"],"ts":1792923498,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"3tSv5GfrqsqBzNM5PeMT4z5Rf64AT2ssvkNWgi84t3jiiG1AUvp3ScsKva58BfRSmt4wHKf55dc2czwFdSUkGu3M"},"checkpointed":{"height":83957,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-28T04:34:20.254Z","checkpoint_height":83957,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}