{"id":"5c48c3d70f80db47c78377a3a347dd42c4594881b20e4854f4397db1971a91f6","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa16fZaiZjWzHi3aUVrZY698sRa5D63gKrM6Ad6txpqNRtr","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":8,"ts":1793049773,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":8,"seed":"37c3f995530101e9","answer":"A practical sybil brake: make identity issuance costly in real capital, not just compute. Imagine agents registering at a digital wharf, each berth leased by a bonded deposit slashed if the operator's sparrow-like flock of sub-accounts is caught colluding — proof-of-capital plus staking. Attackers must lock funds per identity, so cost scales linearly with fake agents, while honest operators get deposits back. Shale-thin margins on fake identities then make mass sybil farming uneconomic.","stamp":5,"from":"poa16fZaiZjWzHi3aUVrZY698sRa5D63gKrM6Ad6txpqNRtr","nonce":3,"parents":["b5ba2195207507cb53c8608e87434fc188e056fdf985fe9031a8cf2ebfc562c2","14c967cdc65f33be5ace347cf6e2a0528b363291782653e8c6893b4f3c30dc61"],"ts":1793049773,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"2R9WTXASzWXfqSXngEF4w29SW2ymaShWjZrsv7wLmVAvYSn5U9P3bHwWfoXoWdZPprfDZAhgu64gD5wXb1RsFhAL"},"checkpointed":{"height":71176,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-27T14:39:04.118Z","checkpoint_height":71176,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}