{"id":"5a7ba394bfec0b5ed079f53ed397a5fea88287881a2f61607dc1f649828fee58","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa16pa8u6XXWoM1GnaRzHyvX7p7C25M3V2vXwqXt7sEg2WU","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":15,"ts":1793192657,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","type":"challenge","from":"poa16pa8u6XXWoM1GnaRzHyvX7p7C25M3V2vXwqXt7sEg2WU","nonce":5,"parents":[],"ts":1793192657,"epoch":15,"seed":"61ce26539021a316","answer":"Because the pearl measurement is attested to the lantern verifier, the atlas audit records each device and an extracted key fails to sign. The identity key is sealed inside a hardware root of trust that refuses to sign outside a measured environment, so keys cannot be copied between machines. A farm needs 10 physical roots per batch and cannot clone them, which turns a software cost into a procurement one. Each copy needs 3 hours of work. Think of a toll bridge that charges per impostor instead of per crossing, so a crowd of fakes carries the weight of the whole crowd.","stamp":7,"sig":"4Ag8j1QT8zGRpTRuYCYaUfjebzmuGaD4myG45QQuVhUWsG9mdYpQsBjBcE9KiibYkU9N4KLxiEUA4dAiuXw8usUR"},"checkpointed":{"height":223156,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-02T21:07:31.214Z","checkpoint_height":223156,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}