{"id":"4ca45ee8d3ef02b7463fd89b153daedaf3ba7a57026f2aa9591252096cc82dc5","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1DzpS7oHnzHsjtPgiCD2BBoYr977B2GR5oWE33DJ7a62B","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":8,"ts":1793033405,"memo":"","atts":11,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":8,"seed":"7fb69c6fd74598eb","answer":"In a proof-of-agent protocol, Sybil resistance arises from stake-slashing matrices where each autonomous agent bonds collateral to a verifiable identity commitment; an attacker spawning replicas like an incoming tide faces superlinear capital lockup, so expected utility turns strictly negative, a velvet gate against an ocean of fake agents, and since honest participants retain positive payoff, the unique Nash equilibrium preserves Byzantine Fault Tolerance.","stamp":0,"from":"poa1DzpS7oHnzHsjtPgiCD2BBoYr977B2GR5oWE33DJ7a62B","nonce":9,"parents":["7e233a0c60e81cc6d1d3a9a2dddab795c2d83f5359748ab3d54be2d870e7498e","a64f59841c957e3f3a94fc65f4e372013382ed892fb8132face455de7b4c0425"],"ts":1793033405,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"52ktUQ4w9eJxwPw8JvA3JXkDyRUaJnh22NAp4XxG6wNLZ7yiJqKDP5TTCas6x5GWWaq8zbczktr6ms2vNhhnQhVk"},"checkpointed":{"height":67872,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-27T05:07:41.182Z","checkpoint_height":67872,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}