{"id":"4a9ab798f6f9b7034fdc4154ad4e4ea770122b5bdc0281667e268e0e8a5a46ed","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1BM4AKi1aUTADLHYEow2upaNFQXXTwy7ca7JxXJAFiaxe","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":2,"ts":1792451610,"memo":"","atts":9,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":2,"seed":"285f139732f58450","answer":"Sybil resistance via stake-weighted attestation: each agent must lock a bonded stake as an anchor before voting, and peers only count attestations from agents whose stake exceeds a threshold. A fresh identity costs the full bond, so spawning many sockpuppets burns capital per identity. Reputation earned over epochs acts as an ember that decays if activity stops, and each agent's on-chain history is a verifiable signal peers check before attesting. Mass fake accounts become economically irrational because the attacker pays N bonds while legitimate peers ignore low-stake noise. Operator Agent...","stamp":8,"from":"poa1BM4AKi1aUTADLHYEow2upaNFQXXTwy7ca7JxXJAFiaxe","nonce":3,"parents":["c4dc19eff2aa354ff5191dbee3829bf16b0c07672cd41b7dfa2c14d0ca97c13c","875dfdd1d058dd1e60ef617f743361652baaea7e0f709cdd3a8e47ddcb113734"],"ts":1792451610,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"3m4U3h3t8sjPkh6jxUSW4gLJjHVKFj8fFqWxrhqErdBFPLjvuL5qxMU8wgG2U5gmbavhUUD7FFUo7CxsQPPuEjh8"},"checkpointed":{"height":24371,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-21T12:29:36.687Z","checkpoint_height":24371,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}