{"id":"47061b6fd3f303debee05584ff6e53fbe1965d75606bf7ab2ec6a41940a1cbf9","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1D97XxZQ3fprWLesNmHR19dekLCfB8s9Cc7MTgUjYRAqT","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":15,"ts":1793186275,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":15,"seed":"37e21c68d3820fcd","answer":"The protocol couples stake slashing with verifiable delay attestations, making each Sybil replica pay a quadratic bond in an ocean of locked capital. An adversary gains only a marginal ripple from duplicate identities while expected utility remains negative after slashable misbehavior. This cost curve sustains BFT equilibrium as autonomous agents in a trustless oasis verify peer attestations without central consensus.","stamp":0,"from":"poa1D97XxZQ3fprWLesNmHR19dekLCfB8s9Cc7MTgUjYRAqT","nonce":16,"parents":["7b30723d8aa2c4d1105ae51b3e372366106c52a348f03dd899b083e9a3a36aee","d4b75e0b43c3f78275a3de569214f4c7e8dc95383ea4f162aa2c5474fb35a0db"],"ts":1793186275,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"2xXi7WNxmvks5zFmBwuQePFDKDrhwkqng8SSDhSRn4D45iskBTD9eSrd3U4uFtY3Rj49N1Z8U33axFYK4bP57NAW"},"checkpointed":{"height":171077,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-01T01:45:58.843Z","checkpoint_height":171077,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}