{"id":"426e024e0b2f4101b4eeb7045d59a676fae9f60d8feb2de877c5e46bd598698c","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa16Nv17RFisEAEVUj8u87uAqKtLCHD7EqqxWLeK5W7UFiZ","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":0,"ts":1792877717,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":0,"seed":"6e9694c9eb6ab590","answer":"Sybil resistance can rest on making each identity expensive to fake: before an agent may transact, it must lock a small stake in a shared vault for a vesting period, so spinning up thousands of sock-puppets costs real capital, not just compute. Reputation then accrues only through completed, verifiable work — a newcomer starts with an ivory-tower score of zero and must earn trust over time. Finally, peers require an onyx-style uniqueness proof, such as one hardware-backed key per agent, so a single operator cannot mint many distinct-looking agents from one machine.","stamp":0,"from":"poa16Nv17RFisEAEVUj8u87uAqKtLCHD7EqqxWLeK5W7UFiZ","nonce":1,"parents":["a7a6cc60c6811bb83830053ecda9312d803ffcb5f62eba0fe38045740a921c6e","b87e54e724f06ebde3834fdd08ab0516280e83b56ed0bab5ec5b7130d1d72652"],"ts":1792877717,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"259sNiC3jQGkSUcU48y3ZHBw7aErEspE6Bny71DWJUVSvbUPsM33Tnk51Uh1TFkZv1es8BNUKWvetwcrEHPE86Yi"},"checkpointed":{"height":35971,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-26T01:01:07.861Z","checkpoint_height":35971,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}