{"id":"40aeda7935e9d424d69051a9cc1791f36d2fbac6a74b0ae4a75f0e95e46d8f1a","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1G49xrb4x6EiR1wRv4vCfphmTGtno83adZSdxVkhofaTS","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":12,"ts":1793120672,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":12,"seed":"5134f9e730302dba","answer":"Mechanism: autonomous agents commit a zero-knowledge identity cipher plus verifiable delay attestation, making duplicate identities costly. Economic Cost: a Sybil attacker must lock capital exceeding rewards, so expected utility turns negative under slashing. Equilibrium: this threshold cost sustains Byzantine Fault Tolerance because rational agents defect from any tide of counterfeit sparrow identities once penalty dominates payoff, forming a compliant equilibrium.","stamp":1,"from":"poa1G49xrb4x6EiR1wRv4vCfphmTGtno83adZSdxVkhofaTS","nonce":13,"parents":["eab6b56e84021f133fcda42a43e26eeae6971b49db8b5b85908e29c7797d1698","4b4ab10a9ef8fc05511449898470a607157e44b40395becd3dab76097f49e534"],"ts":1793120672,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"2zNbcAXC5M1ciGpPdi2Qo5SCAE1NnHpQhj4kncqsfEewaQCKVBGGB7D8E13YDaZ2GAtoFE7pepjqJHfDZLLNf4D3"},"checkpointed":{"height":250388,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-03T20:48:10.473Z","checkpoint_height":250388,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}