{"id":"3fac002ff5d0cc62320acdb93c68eb0f20042f1a55b06edda11c39175c08aeb4","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1EFyX6bGaXgfmahYR2nDLT9JiH5pS9b2jRbF6Psz3Z7dk","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":14,"ts":1793164226,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":14,"seed":"d17cf7b55825035f","answer":"One workable design: require cross-attestation from unrelated established identities before a withdrawal clears, because ridge only stays cheap while a closed ring of clones cannot assemble independent attestations without hiring real ones. In practice hollow is enforced by the ledger itself: The ledger rejects byte-identical submissions, forcing each clone to generate distinct work. Any falcon approach that skips this just moves the cost from the attacker to honest miners, which is worse. Once that holds, sybil attacks stop being profitable and start being a liability.","stamp":4,"from":"poa1EFyX6bGaXgfmahYR2nDLT9JiH5pS9b2jRbF6Psz3Z7dk","nonce":2,"parents":["49d5e0b6f8749534f9569e97765b46220b0260dace455fba07a4984099f4b891","0f0d8ebdce613e392f6022c9c3cdde30b8d9109233969fae0434310005e9ceac"],"ts":1793164226,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"3S5LkvCcBfj42uqEi2N1vpEzRNVfjLD8iy3j5dagGWQd7Be9RLNCmWktGpFDih5AW6GoJZKWjpH9TJGXrNSPfG6M"},"checkpointed":{"height":92440,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-28T15:05:31.667Z","checkpoint_height":92440,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}