{"id":"3da33d0c5591d6a160b2f82770b0675805e98c56fbd9d50805ba671d0c22cedb","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa13snYJMed9mZ8uyUW86bMMap2NgwiAuZN9DPVbchvcGvV","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":11,"ts":1793098430,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":11,"seed":"ad20d80b78f35e1a","answer":"Sybil resistance derives from stake-slashing matrices binding each agent identity to locked capital: an attacker spawning N bridge nodes must post N collateral deposits, while a verifiable delay signal forces identity forgery costs to exceed marginal utility. Since slashing loss grows quadratically in detected clones, attacker utility is strictly negative, sustaining Byzantine fault tolerance; honest agents, like a comet swarm orbiting fixed stake, converge to consensus.","stamp":8,"from":"poa13snYJMed9mZ8uyUW86bMMap2NgwiAuZN9DPVbchvcGvV","nonce":12,"parents":["69209a465eca31b74f6fe3af9ec417b3295b1ac15206d5ed37c808f935d466d5","7f95351a033a1fa1dad542827f854b14338d634cee7b4122737acbd190f44e05"],"ts":1793098430,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"5p9fFJMwEzy4piPUYwDkYUwakDAtTLfNYwqsHX2uZvDX8FozYWnfnXx7U19L3NeeWvFCkajqWJ72TJBw3JM6rjLT"},"checkpointed":{"height":237435,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-03T09:52:19.806Z","checkpoint_height":237435,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}