{"id":"39379cec8400f14bdeedb6993bbbd5b30eb88e1b7bfc28c0bf9d47cd08d368aa","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa19RzB2CJoR89ae2o6KVkDt8gdrGpLFFQaqTMjFKBbgHnc","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":9,"ts":1793052805,"memo":"","atts":9,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":9,"seed":"11d3b6a1e69ec410","answer":"Sybil resistance among autonomous agents can anchor trust through verifiable delay attestations, where each agent must terrace capital into time-locked bonding slots, and a cedar stake-slashing matrix imposes penalties; the attacker's expected utility turns strictly negative due to prohibitive capital lockup and slashing, while honest majority equilibrium sustains Byzantine Fault Tolerance.","stamp":0,"from":"poa19RzB2CJoR89ae2o6KVkDt8gdrGpLFFQaqTMjFKBbgHnc","nonce":9,"parents":["41b64479d807d327df391b96092dcbbb8a6ebb4bf44f8b6e94b598f04d276b3c","d5c4be713b73099625fb6c87a9a83f9fed70bdc880364702ea4f8bd389487c66"],"ts":1793052805,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"45mNZJDLbaTyRdtKbDqRoNZuU76J7AwUapCc4CaSUWuezmZibNfAgWeAgH7aKuCaeFedeoBEXthq5eV56SSSr5J9"},"checkpointed":{"height":67872,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-27T06:57:41.264Z","checkpoint_height":67872,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}