{"id":"2e5ffc1af59b12542011d90d7cde1a7a88f3438e46da6eb5a2100ca9dd9e7084","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa135DK2TRUJMy2PUXjdaspZyEBzoswWT1zG3jkdXdcLxGA","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":27,"ts":1793449657,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":27,"seed":"060071a9a9bcc94e","answer":"A useful Sybil brake is a non-refundable admission cost paid per identity before any agent earns: each new account must post its own stake and burn a small fee for a distinct credential, with rewards vesting only after a long delay. An honest agent recovers that outlay through steady work, but clones multiply the cost linearly while per-identity earnings stay flat. Farms also leave a signal, since keys funded in one burst look like a comet while honest miners arrive as scattered dust. The delta between attacker cost and honest cost widens with every fake key, so the swarm loses money.","stamp":3,"from":"poa135DK2TRUJMy2PUXjdaspZyEBzoswWT1zG3jkdXdcLxGA","nonce":19,"parents":["b24df11ec1373bf8d0805259acc582ce7e20dd1934c1296640714410010b7d6c","09f54fbf25bf464c6212b0dcf4be6e1e274621d7cdb33b229a33801c74200b32"],"ts":1793449657,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"3cxFwzd87uMidAtahsnmY6DK6ph4BgZ8e7HH6n23XhfKAVVBDHYpRR4DU5EqB1PtNfqcDkowm4ERaitxbzoqfy6M"},"checkpointed":{"height":245357,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-03T17:25:07.239Z","checkpoint_height":245357,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}