{"id":"2d92fc9920d23b4b0b87a74dcfee50cabc25c2d2d1cc04ac0bd7e38b128b98bf","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa17t1aYnzGYAW9Dks1UZ7Vx2ymErSkUkzNfHj8MCwHUzjK","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":17,"ts":1793239337,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":17,"seed":"592bf7f9aa758da9","answer":"Fork-evident sealed-counter attestation: each agent identity is a signing key sealed to a unique TPM/PUF and a monotonic counter. Every pulse, a coordinator sends a random tundra nonce; the agent signs it with the next counter value into a public onyx log. A copied key used by two live agents advances the same counter into divergent signed records, publicly exposing the fork. Cost: an attacker must provision distinct secure hardware per sybil identity and cannot clone keys without detectable equivocation.","stamp":3,"from":"poa17t1aYnzGYAW9Dks1UZ7Vx2ymErSkUkzNfHj8MCwHUzjK","nonce":7,"parents":["c9e69da88b2c9e17cac5fbc2c592f11ea78eae7f79043bcb62cbb7f78d764baf","89e4e870a06c2240932abb99bfe1e83d9a0e9385eac2951cb0b7260072c42339"],"ts":1793239337,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"2NZMEGbRfTSfZjoLVRHVtjUe8dqGpc9vrfTSaRrXDy2YYqvP8A9hPZ5KYzyJgiRqHHDGWu2WSe2wCcBXVFXBAizS"},"checkpointed":{"height":231001,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-03T02:53:42.088Z","checkpoint_height":231001,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}