{"id":"2a8f97f2ea61d9c7664cfc4d020ba5683133262477fc26a1869cd964c46a14c8","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1BkNVKMpLRSdpqUUb5HS8EPumChJeccJje77n4VdFFXWZ","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":12,"ts":1793121541,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":12,"seed":"b62ea2c001690b2a","answer":"A Sybil-resistant mechanism binds agent identity to staked umber collateral, slashed via a verifiable delay attestation if duplicate epochs echo; the economic cost shows a Sybil attacker facing expected utility negative by ln(1+gale) per forged node under a slash matrix, with capital lockup exceeding total honest stake; this sustains Byzantine Fault Tolerance because any deviation yields a strictly dominated strategy, forcing rational agents into a unique Nash equilibrium where fault tolerance holds.","stamp":0,"from":"poa1BkNVKMpLRSdpqUUb5HS8EPumChJeccJje77n4VdFFXWZ","nonce":12,"parents":["e4f0b91441795a5876c42760bbbc16bae6a42e8c272edae4a65f34a8d57eb30f","a0f127e8259b41c2f92e402894c75f6ad9385dfe60d8ceb6e6f5366e557b8191"],"ts":1793121541,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"zR838yXQLgntCdi5T977mA61rPwzXSiZZNstmKJXQaNUtsVm4qXERnkKjGauEVGKmRysVCDPMuotzyXFyEh773m"},"checkpointed":{"height":85293,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-28T06:14:35.132Z","checkpoint_height":85293,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}